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Demanding Power: Contentious 
Politics and Electricity in Pakistan 
Umair Javed, with Aiza Hussain and Hassan Aziz 
June 2021 
Summary 
This paper explores Pakistan’s electricity supply crisis that lasted from 2007 to 
2015, and the ensuing contention that shaped public discourse and political 
events in the country. During this period, which witnessed electricity outages of 
up to 14 hours per day, 456 incidents of contention took place, with just under 
20 per cent escalating into some form of violence. Electricity became the number 
one political issue in the country and was integral in shaping the outcomes of the 
2013 General Election. Following the election, public authorities undertook 
extensive investment to expand capacity and ensure consistency in supply while 
evading questions about affordability and sustainability. 
On the surface, this appears to be a case of extensive protest working towards 
shaping state responsiveness. And it is true that the state now sees supply as a 
non-negotiable aspect in the social contract with citizens. However, a range of 
factors contributed to the chronology and the selective, generation-focused 
nature of this response: the cross-sectional socioeconomic and organisational 
nature of those impacted by the crisis; the increasing cost imposed on public 
authorities by extensive protests; the nature of the political opportunity structure 
available for opposition political parties to capitalise on the crisis; and the 
pressures imposed by key civil society actors, most dominantly, the private news 
media. On the other hand, citizen inclusion and participation in decision-making, 
and issues of affordability and sustainability, which impact vulnerable and 
disempowered groups the most, remain absent from the political and policy 
conversation around energy. This suggests that while protests were useful in 
generating a short-term response, their long-term legacy in empowerment 
related outcomes is less visible. 
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Between 2007 and 2015, Pakistan witnessed over 400 contentious incidents – 
including but not limited to marches, rallies, sit-ins, protests, and riots – related to 
provision of and access to electricity. These incidents map on to a particularly 
troubling decade for energy provision and stability, during which the country 
experienced crippling electricity shortages that, at their peak in 2012–13, saw 
outages exceed 14 hours per day. This crisis of provision swiftly transformed into 
a prolonged public and political crisis, one driven by mass anger and resentment 
at not just the management of energy provision by the state, but broader facets 
of governance failure and corruption. 
Public anger at electricity outages in Pakistan, which in many instances became 
extremely violent, provides us with a useful lens to study issues pertaining to 
popular mobilisation and public accountability in a setting historically 
characterised by authoritarian forms of government, weak political parties, lack of 
‘mobilising structures’ within civil society, and various axes of violent conflict. 
This paper, then, draws on the case study of electricity-related contention 
between 2007 and 2015 in Pakistan, as part of a larger comparative study that 
aims to understand the conditions under which struggles over energy access 
empower people to hold public authorities to account. 
While the crisis of electricity outages escalated after the global recession and 
resulting oil price shock from 2008 onwards, it took on immense political 
significance in Pakistan from 2011 onwards, dominating media and political 
conversations across the country. The 2013 General Election, Pakistan’s second 
since its transition to procedural democracy in 2008, was labelled in its run-up as 
a referendum on the electricity crisis. The party that eventually won, the Pakistan 
Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN), was said to be successful because it, more than 
any other party, prioritised a resolution to the crisis in its campaign.1 And on 
some measures, it was able to deliver. Since 2015, outages (or ‘load-shedding’ 
in local parlance) declined from an average of 14 hours per day in 2012 to under 
3 hours per day by 2018. Much of this is down to the China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) collaboration, which is responsible for US$33bn of investment 
in the power sector through to 2022 by Chinese firms and associated joint 
ventures.  
At the same time, however, problematic aspects pertaining to the financial and 
environmental health of the electricity sector continue to limit the actual extent to 
which the problem stands ‘resolved’, especially when it comes to key questions 
 
1  All three main contending parties, the incumbent Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), its main rival the  
PMLN, and the new challenger in 2013, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) devoted considerable space 
in their manifestos to possible solutions to prolonged electricity outages. 
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of energy affordability and sustainability for citizens.2 Given the chain of events 
during this period, this paper presents findings generated as part of research 
designed to help answer the following question: 
How and under which conditions do struggles over energy access in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings empower the powerless to hold public 
authorities to account over energy, or more broadly, over other issues? 
This paper draws together findings about these issues of contention over energy 
and its effects on accountability and empowerment in Pakistan.3 Briefly put, a 
range of factors contributed to the chronology and the selective, generation-
focused nature of the response: (1) the cross-sectional socioeconomic and 
organisational nature of those impacted by the crisis; (2) the increasing cost 
imposed on public authorities by extensive protests; (3) the nature of the political 
opportunity structure available for opposition political parties to capitalise on the 
crisis; and (4) the pressures imposed from within key civil society actors, most 
dominantly, the private news media. These findings are elaborated upon in 
subsequent sections to build a causal narrative that can help us understand the 
way public authorities reacted to contention around electricity in Pakistan. 
1.1 Background and motivations 
Data on energy protests in Pakistan, collated for this project, showcase the 
pervasive nature of public mobilisation related to electricity. Between 2007 and 
2015, there were 443 separate protest incidents, taking place in both urban and 
rural areas in all four provinces and what were at the time three federally 
administered territories of the country.4 Several of these incidents, particularly in 
the summers of 2011, 2012, and 2013, were part of elongated and multi-sited 
contentious episodes that lasted for several days on end, creating considerable 
unrest and posing law and order challenges for public authorities at the federal, 
provincial, and local level. Overall, 28 per cent of all protest incidents 
experienced some degree of violence on the part of either public authorities 
(police or paramilitary) or the protestors.5 
 
2  As discussed ahead, the biggest challenge remains the cost of electricity, which results in ‘circular debt’ 
– the difference between a higher cost of generation (guaranteed by purchase contracts) and the lower 
cost at which it is sold to consumers, which is supposed to be met by the government. By February 
2020, the total stockpile of circular debt (outstanding differential arrears to be paid to various actors in 
the electricity supply chain) stood at just over US$11bn. 
3  While the overall project was motivated by a focus on energy protests in general, and fuel and fuel 
subsidy related protests more specifically, research in Pakistan was adapted to the issue of electricity 
access, subsidy, and pricing which, given the fuel mix for generation, is heavily linked to global oil pricing 
and related shocks. 
4  On 31 May 2018, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) were merged into the neighbouring 
province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa through the 25th constitutional amendment. The remaining two 
federally administered regions are Gilgit-Baltistan and the national capital territory of Islamabad. 
5  Details on the collection and classification of protest data is provided in the methodology section. 
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The scale of the protests due to the underlying crisis of electricity outages, when 
viewed in the light of Pakistan’s significant history of authoritarian rule and the 
relative weakness of its civil society organisations, poses several interesting 
questions within the ambit of contentious politics: what factors made such 
mobilisation possible? To what extent can the protests be categorised as 
spontaneous ‘eruptions’? What actors figured prominently in making these 
protests happen? 
While these questions are important areas of enquiry, and are dealt with 
accordingly in this paper, what makes electricity protests from this period worth 
evaluating is the way the state ultimately responded to the crisis itself from 2013 
onwards – in this case by prioritising massive investment in electricity 
generation, without adequate measures taken to improve affordability and 
sustainability.  
The interaction between the outage crisis linked to global oil shocks from 2007 
onwards, citizen struggles over access and the resulting scale of public 
contention, and the state’s response from 2012–13 onwards stand to reveal 
interesting insights into the nature of accountability and empowerment around 
energy-related issues. Why did the state respond in the way that it did? What 
made a response that prioritised investment in generation possible during the 
2013–18 period? What prevents other types of reform that prioritise sustainability 
and affordability of energy? These interactions, and the related questions they 
give rise to, serve as the primary source of motivation for both the Demanding 
Power project, and the Pakistan case study within it. 
1.2 The Demanding Power project 
People living with poverty and exclusion generally lack the power to hold public 
authorities to account. Their efforts to do so are likely to be tougher still if they 
live in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where the rule of law may be 
unevenly applied, civic space restricted, and rights violated with impunity. Yet, 
evidence also suggests that at key moments, and in defence of their basic 
needs, otherwise powerless people in such settings have occasionally mounted 
social and political action that has empowered them to demand a public 
response.  
Centring on the increasingly important but under-researched issue of access to 
energy, this project comparatively explores how and when such social and 
political action emerges; how it manifests; its effects in terms of the services it 
secures and people’s capacities to hold public authorities to account; and 
whether it feeds into longer-term dynamics of empowerment and accountability 
in fragile and conflict settings. The project involves in-depth work in 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan. 
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Within Pakistan, the project’s focus is on electricity as the energy source of 
interest. As discussed at length in the subsequent section, this choice was 
motivated by the central role electricity plays in the lives and livelihoods of 
Pakistani citizens, and by the susceptibility of the country’s electricity sector to 
global economic events, such as the 2008 recession and the resulting oil price 
shock. Vulnerabilities to adverse changes in the global economy puts Pakistan 
among a large number of countries where the state is expected to deal with the 
political and economic consequences of energy price volatility through subsidies 
and other interventions. At the same time, the fact that this relationship is 
particularly pronounced in the electricity sector also provides complementary 
insights on questions of how states manage developmental aspirations and 
citizen demands that are linked to the provision of large-scale infrastructure, 
such as power plants, dams, and grid sub-stations. 
1.3 Country context: the political economy of 
energy in everyday life in Pakistan 
1.3.1 Electricity in everyday lives 
Pakistan’s energy consumption is considerably diverse, with fuel, natural gas, 
and electricity playing an important role across rural and urban populations. The 
country is a net importer for its energy needs, with oil products and, more 
recently, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and coal constituting nearly 25 per cent of 
the entire import basket. A portion of total energy demand is met through 
domestic natural gas production of around 4 billion cubic feet per day (BCFD). 
Collectively, natural gas, oil, and coal account for almost 60 per cent of total 
energy consumption in the country. Across the country, and particularly 
intensively in rural areas, traditional fuels such as biomass, wood, and kerosene 
comprise around 40 per cent of energy requirements. 
Natural gas, LNG, coal, and oil are also used as key inputs for the electricity 
sector. Pakistan’s electricity consumption stands at around 600 kilowatt hour 
(kWh) per capita. While this is still higher than the South Asian average, the 
electricity crisis since 2007 has led to extremely low annual growth in per capita 
electricity consumption, especially when compared to India and Bangladesh, 
both of which doubled their per capita consumption of electricity between 2007 
and 2019.  
Ninety per cent of Pakistan’s urban population is connected to the electricity grid, 
while the estimate for the rural population is much lower at around 63 per cent. 
Overall, estimates using survey data place electricity access at 71 per cent of the 
total population, which means around 40 million citizens – overwhelmingly rural – 
still lack access to grid electricity (IEA 2017). This gap is overcome through 
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relying on indigenous energy sources as well as increasingly turning to 
standalone solar solutions, connected to battery arrays. While these have helped 
meet some household needs, such as lighting, fans, and small appliances, they 
fall some way short of producing energy for commercial and agricultural use. 
1.3.2 Electricity supply and system 
Pakistan has a semi-public/private electricity system. Transmission and 
distribution functions remain almost entirely in the hands of federal government-
owned and operated entities (except in the city of Karachi where a private entity 
runs a vertically integrated utility), while the private sector plays a significant role 
in electricity generation. The current system traces its origins back to the early 
1990s that witnessed the ‘unbundling’ of the power sector under a large reform 
initiative led by the World Bank. The long-term objective of the reform was to 
create a competitive market in all three major arenas of the system (Burki 2007). 
However, so far, the reform effort has only resulted in the introduction of private 
sector entities within electricity generation, labelled as independent power 
producers (IPPs). Various policy instruments, the first of which was issued in 
1994, have determined the scope and terms of private sector activity in 
generation. Broadly speaking, the government acts as the sole buyer of 
electricity from producers, to whom it offers a set tariff as well as a guaranteed 
return on equity (Asif 2011). These terms were offered to encourage investment, 
which they were successful in doing but as discussed later in this paper, only at 
the cost of long-term affordability and financial viability of the sector. By 2020, 
IPPs were responsible for 45 per cent of the total installed capacity of 36,010 
megawatts (MW) in the country. Electricity purchased from IPPs is added to the 
public transmission system (along with electricity produced by state-owned 
generation companies – GENCOs) and then distributed to end consumers 
through the working of ten state-owned and operated distribution companies 
(DISCOs) (NEPRA 2020).6 
Despite efforts to revise the fuel mix in recent years, the country remains heavily 
reliant on thermal sources for electricity generation. Coal, oil products, LNG, and 
domestic natural gas account for 58 per cent of electricity generated, while 
hydroelectric power (through the state-owned Water and Power Development 
Authority – WAPDA) accounts for a further 31 per cent. The remaining is divided 
between state-owned nuclear power and small-scale solar and wind-based 
generation.7 On the back of the supply/outage crisis between 2007 and 2015, 
 
6  Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi, has an integrated utility owned and operated by a private sector 
company called K-Electric (known as the Karachi Electric Supply Company prior to its privatisation). 
7  The state’s effort to shift away from oil as a source of electricity generation has been met with some 
success. The share of electricity produced using refined furnace oil has fallen from 30 per cent in 2013 
to under 10 per cent in 2019. However, the bulk of this shift has been towards coal and liquified natural 
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total installed capacity has seen considerable gains in recent years, rising from 
21,000 MW in 2013 to 36,010 MW in 2020. Total electricity generation has also 
risen from 98,213 gigawatt hours (GWh) to 133,615 GWh over the same period 
(NEPRA 2020). 
1.3.3 Electricity subsidies, financial viability, and the 2007–15 crisis 
Understanding the structure of energy (primarily electricity) subsidies in Pakistan 
requires an understanding of the system through which electricity is produced 
and distributed. Collectively the political economy of both factors – the subsidy 
and the supply and distribution system – are central in understanding the 
electricity supply crisis witnessed between 2007 and 2015, and the affordability 
and sustainability crisis that continues to date. 
Electricity sector subsidies in Pakistan are primarily borne out of the difference 
between the cost of generating electricity and the price at which it is sold to 
consumers. Simply put, electricity generated has historically been more 
expensive due to a range of factors (fixed returns to generation companies, 
expensive input fuel, theft, and inability to recover electricity bills), while 
governments have largely been reluctant to charge the full cost to paying 
consumers. This difference between the determined tariff (actual cost) and 
notified tariff (rates actually paid by consumers depending on category and total 
consumption) is partially covered through a tariff differential subsidy (TDS) and is 
partially allowed to accumulate as a liability on the balance sheet of DISCOs 
(Lodhi 2017). 
Subsidy outlays spiked after generation costs increased following the global oil 
price shock between 2008 and 2013. At their peak in 2011 – a period of 
considerable turmoil for the sector as a whole – the total subsidy reached 2.5 per 
cent of GDP (US$4bn) (Kiani 2011). Since then, drops in the price of oil, gradual 
increases in tariffs, changes in the fuel mix, and some improvements in 
transmission and distribution governance have brought subsidy outlays to 0.4 per 
cent of GDP (US$1.2bn) by 2018 (Zhang 2018).  
Analysis of the incidence of the electricity subsidy shows that, while a larger 
share of households in the bottom deciles of per capita income lie in the bottom 
two or three consumption bands, a large share of those in all the remaining 
deciles also have consumption in those bands. Consequently, the subsidy which 
is nominally intended for the poor is, in fact, being consumed primarily by those 
of middle-income households. Furthermore, the poorest households are most 
likely to exist in remote rural locations and are thus unlikely to be connected to 
 
gas, both of which are also primarily imported. The share of nuclear energy has doubled from 4 to 8 per 
cent over this period. 
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the grid itself, which means they do not benefit from the current structure of the 
subsidy (Bacon 2019). 
Understanding the crisis of supply however also involves looking at the financial 
viability of the entire sector. In particular, the inability of the government to 
undertake large fiscal outlays (subsidies and payments) in order to keep the 
sector running has contributed to the crippling issue of circular debt, which in turn 
has contributed to outages. As explained in a recent diagnostic account by the 
Asian Development Bank: 
‘Circular debt’ is the central problem of Pakistan’s electricity sector. 
Circular debt arises because of non-payment of receivables all along 
the value chain. For example, theft or non-payment by certain 
customers, or tariffs which are below the cost of supply, mean that 
the revenues of the DISCOs are lower than their costs. As a result, 
they fail to fully remit their revenue to CPPA-G (the primary state-
controlled buyer for grid electricity in the country). Consequently, 
CPPA-G is not in a position to pay power suppliers in full, including 
both the GENCOs and IPPs. The power suppliers, in turn, delay 
payment to their fuel suppliers. When circular debt becomes too 
high, fuel suppliers may stop delivery of fuel, which then limits the 
amount of power which can be generated and supplied to 
households.  
(ADB 2020: 175) 
In other terms, the government is unable to pay different actors in the electricity 
supply chain, which results in generation going offline, even if installed capacity 
exceeds total demand.8 This is largely the story of the 2007–15 crisis. As oil 
prices increased,9 generation became more expensive. Two successive 
governments (Musharraf’s military regime, 2006–08, and the PPP government, 
2008–13) remained reluctant to pass on the additional cost to consumers, or to 
raise more revenue by cutting down on transmission and distribution losses. 
Resultantly, as the financial burden of the sector grew in tandem with a 
stagnating economy, the government found itself without adequate resources to 
sustain generation, leading to prolonged outages. 
Despite increases in generation capacity and a marginal reduction in overall cost 
of generation due to changes in the fuel mix and reduction in global oil prices, 
the spectre of circular debt continues to plague sustainability and affordability of 
the electricity sector. By the end of 2019, the government in its role as the sole 
buyer of electricity owed US$7bn to electricity producers, alongside an additional 
 
8  Transmission and distribution losses, delays in price determination and notification, delays in pass 
through of fuel price increases, poor revenue collections, delays in subsidy payments by the government 
to distribution companies all contributed to the growing circular debt. 
9  Oil prices increased from US$66 per barrel in 2006 to US$145 in 2008. 
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US$4 billion owed prior to 2014 that was parked in a government holding 
company. 
1.3.4 Actors and interests in the electricity sector 
No baseline understanding of the complex nature of the electricity supply chain 
in Pakistan is complete without enumerating the large number of actors 
operating within it, and their various interests, incentives, and institutional 
configurations. This section provides a snapshot of the primary stakeholders and 
their relationship within Pakistan’s power sector. 
Electricity sector bureaucracy: Given the degree of government control in both 
the service-provision and regulation of electricity, the sector is largely managed 
and administered by career civil servants (generalists and technical specialists). 
These officials devise and implement important policy decisions, which shape 
the performance and effectiveness of the sector. Officials are motivated by both 
career incentives (lucrative postings and promotions) as well as rent-seeking and 
pecuniary incentives, through close ties with private-sector actors involved in 
generation, construction of electricity infrastructure, and procurement.  
IPPs: Private investment in the power generation sector began in the late 1980s 
with the establishment of Hub Power (to date, Pakistan’s biggest IPP) and was 
formalised under the 1994 Power Policy. Subsequent years have seen later 
iterations of the policy framework regulating private investment in the generation 
sector. As a result, several international firms and major industrial conglomerates 
controlled by powerful businessmen have set up mostly thermal energy-based 
power plants, thus increasing total installed capacity in the country. In 2020, a 
major government report on IPP performance highlighted policy and regulatory 
capture, which has allowed IPPs to accumulate considerable profit through 
government guaranteed capacity payments and returns on equity while flouting 
regulations related to efficiency and sustainability. 
Electricity sector labour unions: As majority government-owned entities, all 
service delivery organisations provide the right of unionisation to their 
employees. Over time, this has resulted in the development of powerful and 
thoroughly entrenched worker unions, especially in WAPDA/DISCOs. The 
biggest and most active amongst these unions is the WAPDA Hydroelectric 
Union representing DISCO employees across the country. The WAPDA 
Hydroelectric Union remains committed to an anti-privatisation agenda, in a bid 
to protect benefits and perquisites as public sector employees. It has, in the past, 
successfully blocked the privatisation of the more efficient DISCOs as well as of 
various parts of the transmission and distribution set-up.  
Industrial and commercial consumers: Organised along the lines of various 
business and trade associations and chambers of commerce, industrial and 
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commercial consumers constitute an important voice in the policy-making 
domain of the energy sector. Industrial consumers, for example from the textile 
sector which utilise gas-captive power plants, lobby the government on energy 
pricing; the duration of power outages; and the supply of electricity during the 
winter months. Industrial and commercial users often resort to closure strikes 
and protests to pressurise the government on access and pricing related issues. 
Domestic consumers: Government policymaking in the sector is often 
undertaken with the impact on the end-consumer in mind, especially in the 
aftermath of the power supply crisis 2013. Rising costs of electricity along with 
prolonged outages have resulted in spontaneous protests and mass unrest in 
major urban centres, especially in Punjab. Given the high importance domestic 
consumers place on energy availability, the government has been reluctant to 
remove the existing untargeted subsidy and to rationalise overall tariffs. 
Politicians: The provision of electricity connections has been used as a political 
public good for the majority of the last three decades. Politicians, thus, have 
become important stakeholders in determining which areas gain access to 
energy supplies, for which in return they are able to garner votes during election 
time. Their political success is also tied to the availability of electricity hence they 
have an active stake in the way DISCOs manage electricity load shedding and 
how the federal government determines its subsidy structure. This has strong 
implications for any holistic energy sector reform proposed by higher levels of 
government. Sections of the political elite also exercise an active interest in the 
rents accrued from electricity sector contracts with IPPs. This inevitably de-
incentivises them to push down too much on the supply-side cost of generation, 
while voter pressure forces them to keep consumer tariffs low as well. 
Judiciary: Over the past seven years, the High Court and the Supreme Court 
have been involved in several high-profile cases involving the energy sector, 
especially in relation to rule violations in procurement; charges of corruption; and 
non-compliant appointments. Such public interest litigation, often initiated by the 
judges themselves, has elevated the higher judiciary to the position of an 
important stakeholder in the energy sector. 
Media and civil society: The recent proliferation of electronic media outlets and 
the parallel rise of civil society organisations working in the realm of consumer 
rights and government transparency, has increased general awareness about 
government administration and policymaking. Various news channels have 
devoted lengthy segments to airing public opinions on the energy crisis (usually 
giving space to outrage over shortages), and some have even conducted 
responsible, informative shows on tariff rationalisation and electricity theft. 
Donors: Pakistan’s electricity sector’s governance and evolution has long been 
impacted by the presence of international donors, most notably the World Bank 
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and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank was a key player in 
the sector reform process that led to the unbundling of generation and regulatory 
functions, as well as the separation of the hydroelectric development arm from 
thermal generation within the state utility. The IMF has played a key role in 
shaping fiscal outlays on the electricity sector, advocating for subsidy reform and 
improving targeting of the subsidy itself, often as part of stabilisation agreements 
with the government. In recent years, the ADB and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) have also stepped up their support to the 
power sector, mostly in the shape of driving technical assistance in the 
transmission and distribution domain. 
The Chinese state: China’s footprint on Pakistan’s economy and politics has 
grown over the past decade. The main vehicle for this has been the CPEC, a 
series of Chinese state debt-funded ventures implemented by Chinese 
companies primarily in road and coal, hydroelectric, and natural gas electricity 
infrastructure across Pakistan. As a result, Chinese government-owned 
companies now have a considerable stake in the electricity sector as a whole 
and are in a position to influence policies related to electricity sector regulation, 
returns on investment, tariff determination, and environmental sustainability. 
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2. Approach and methodology 
The Demanding Power project, of which this research is a part of, set out a 
three-part approach for the analysis of contentious struggles around energy in 
fragile contexts: 
- Comparative analysis across different types of political system and energy 
regime, to enable the testing of propositions and mid-range theories. 
- Analysis at multiple levels of the system, to capture differential 
experiences and levels and forms of power among the different actors. 
- In-depth analysis and process tracing to document empirically and enable 
identification of the mechanisms of impact. 
These requirements indicate the need for a mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
data collection and analysis, to generate evidence that is grounded in the 
specifics of each context, but which also generates generalisable lessons about 
whether contention over energy empowers the powerless to hold the powerful to 
account and, if so, how.  
Primary fieldwork for the overall project, focused on three countries, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan, with some additional comparative analysis 
of data for a set of other countries, selected to test specific propositions about 
the relationship between social and political action around energy and fragile and 
conflict- or violence-affected settings. The research itself has been organised 
into three components: 
Component 1. Energy demands in everyday life: Working in selected rural 
and urban sites in each of the three countries, this component of the project 
focuses on understanding what people’s energy demands are in everyday life, 
and how they go about securing their needs, including their individual and group 
negotiations and strategies with local public authorities and others responsible 
for energy supply. 
Component 2. The political economy of energy policies and protests: This 
component involves a full and detailed analysis of the political economy of 
energy policies and protests in each country. This is based on a literature review 
of the political economy of energy consumption and energy policies for each 
country, a review of data sources, media content analysis of episodes of 
contention according to agreed methodology, key informant interviews and focus 
group discussions (FGDs) with activists involved in particular episodes or 
ongoing contention emerging out of energy struggles.  
Component 3. Energy struggles, empowerment and accountability in 
fragile and other settings: This component is designed in part based on the 
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results of the literature and data review in Component 2. This component helps 
test hypotheses about whether/the extent to which, (a) fragile and conflict 
affected settings may be more prone to energy protests; (b) energy protests 
empower people to hold public authorities to account more broadly; and (c) the 
role and influence of external actors on such events.  
The methodology overall is an innovative mixture of approaches designed to 
uncover and combine a range of explanations for whether and how energy 
protests lead to empowerment and accountability in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings. The chief methodological innovation is its combination of multiple 
perspectives that cut across levels of social and political action, so that the 
project seeks to bring together understanding of the energy demands of 
individuals, the sources of collective grievances and collective action around 
energy, and the transnational influences on such action. It also collects evidence 
on the material dimensions of struggles (prices, points of access, transport and 
electricity needs; levels of corruption); on their subjective, experiential, ideational 
(moral economy ideas, human dignity and natural rights, experiences of state 
repression) aspects; and on the mechanisms through which they are 
communicated (the news media, popular music, demonstrations and slogans). 
2.1 Pakistan case study methodology 
Research for the Pakistan case study involved several sources of mixed-method 
data collection. Primary research for the first component of the study was carried 
out through five FGDs (with 42 participants in total) and eight in-depth interviews 
with protest organisers, participants, and observers in two select localities (Kot 
Lakhpat/Chungi Amer Sidhu, Lahore; and Kamalia town, Toba Tek Singh) that 
had been the sites of prolonged public mobilisation and ‘unruly’ contention over 
electricity shortages. In Chungi, a working-class neighbourhood in the city of 
Lahore, separate FGDs were carried out with protest organisers and participants, 
both men and women. In Kamalia, discussions were carried out with members of 
the Kamalia market traders’ association (Anjuman-e-Tajran) who played a 
central role in organising and financing electricity related protests between 2007 
and 2015. 
These FGDs helped secure valuable information on the dynamics of protest, 
who the protesting publics were, the organisational basis on which demands 
were made to public authorities, and the role played by political actors 
(politicians, party activists, and government officials) in electricity-related 
contention. They also illuminated the centrality of electricity to the lives and 
livelihoods of citizens and shed light on the textures and modalities of state-
citizen interaction over electricity access. 
The information gathered through FGDs was selectively supplemented with 
community key informant interviews in order to obtain more information on 
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mobilisation, contention, and everyday struggles over energy from particular 
members of the community (activists, local organisers, local notables). 
Research for Component 2 of the study was carried out in four stages. The first 
was the development of the events catalogue of electricity related contention. 
The second was process tracing, using secondary sources, the history of 
electricity reform, the genesis and layout of the crisis along with the political 
economy context of contention, and finally mapping out the response of public 
authorities. The third was plugging gaps in the process tracing by conducting 18 
key informant interviews with politicians, electricity sector officials, donors, 
academics, and policy advisors who were involved with the electricity sector 
between 2007 and 2015. The fourth and final stage was collating representations 
of the crisis in popular culture by looking at internet discourse, media 
representations, YouTube videos, satire, and references in music, television, 
cinema, and other cultural output during this period. 
2.2 The Demanding Power Pakistan events 
catalogue 
The Pakistan Demanding Power data set substantively builds on existing protest 
data to compile a comprehensive catalogue of 456 incidents of contentious 
politics around electricity access, availability, and pricing from 2007 to 2015. 
There were two primary data sets that were used to mine the initial data: 
- The BFRS political violence data set, which covers all violent incidents in 
Pakistan reported in the daily Dawn (Lahore edition) between 1988 and 
2011. The BFRS data set has a sub-category of service delivery protests 
around energy (fuel and electricity). It also has sampled verification of its 
incident universe using an alternative media source. However, its utility 
was limited by its definitional use, which covered protests that involved 
some element of violent contention (arson, rioting, casualties). 
- The Ahsan Butt-GMU protest data set, which covers 4,123 protest 
incidents in Pakistan, reported in the daily Dawn (online edition) between 
2005 and 2009. The ABGMU records protests by type of actors involved 
but does not provide cause of protest. 
Fourteen energy incidents from the BFRS data set were identified using the 
existing categorisation. For the ABGMU data set, a careful string search of all 
4,123 protest incidents was carried out using the terms ‘electricity’, ‘energy’, 
‘protest’, ‘riot’, ‘load-shedding’, ‘outages’, ‘power’, ‘tariffs’, and combinations of 
these terms, to identify 261 incidents. These were then cross-checked to ensure 
there was no overlap with the 14 incidents identified from the other data set, and 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 551 





duplicates were deleted. Web addresses (URLs) linking to the news report of 
each incident were recorded in a separate column. 
For 2010–15, the online edition of Dawn newspaper was used with the search 
terms mentioned above. The benefits of the online edition are that it captures 
news stories from all regional bureaus of the newspaper, thus providing a more 
comprehensive overview. In this phase, a further 442 incidents were recorded by 
date of publication, location (district level), headline, and reported incident URL. 
In the second phase, each news report was manually assessed to extract key 
pieces of information including more granular location data, identity of protestors, 
and other variables developed for the events catalogue template. 
The use of Dawn to identify events is standard practice in academic research on 
Pakistan. It is regarded as Pakistan’s only English-language newspaper of 
record inside and outside the country, possesses an extensive reporting network, 
and generally has a non-partisan reputation. However, the following issues are 
worth flagging: 
- Dawn’s main bureaus are located in five cities (Islamabad, Lahore, 
Karachi, Peshawar, and Quetta). While these provide good coverage 
across each region, the reporting network in peripheral areas is unlikely to 
be as effective. News stories from those regions compete with stories 
from other locations at the bureau level for relatively small amounts of 
reporting space. Thus, the events catalogue cannot be taken as 
comprehensive of all power-related contentious action during this period, 
but it covers all significant episodes that took place during this period. 
- Vernacular papers (Urdu-language) have more regional editions, which 
means there is less competition for publication space. They are likely to 
both cover a greater number of protests and provide more granular details 
of each protest. Given their reach, we relied on Urdu-language 
newspapers to accumulate details about particular protest events that had 
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3. Political fragility and the escalation 
of energy struggles 
Why do struggles around energy specifically appear to have the potential to grow 
into significant episodes of contention within settings where political authority is 
fragmented or fragile, and conflict and violence common? Do such features help 
to explain major movements or struggles around energy? This study explored 
the relationship between fragility and energy protests, developed on the basis of 
a review of the literature on the political economy of fossil fuel subsidy reform 
and the contentious politics of food and fuel (Hossain et al. 2018).  
One mechanism proposed to connect fragility to the escalation of energy 
struggles was that fuel subsidies are a more important part of the social contract 
and of social protection in less stable and weakly governed states, and in 
resource-rich/energy exporting countries (which overlap to a considerable extent 
because of the ‘natural resource curse’).  
Pakistan’s case study provides interesting reflections on this by both affirming 
and departing from the suggested mechanism. Electricity access and subsidies 
are certainly an important part of the social contract between the state and 
sections of society, even though Pakistan is not an energy exporting country. 
However, there are two particular aspects to this relationship which link it back to 
the development of contentious politics. The first of these is the historical role of 
electricity grid access and expansion as a signifier of developmental progress, 
especially for urban consumers. As Naqvi (2016, 2017) highlights, since at least 
the 1980s, electricity access has been utilised by successive democratic and 
authoritarian regimes in showcasing their developmental commitment and 
credentials. One outcome of the rapid expansion of the grid is that urban 
consumers, in particular, have become accustomed to seeing access to 
electricity as a state-granted prerogative, one which is defined as an intrinsic part 
of the social contract with the state.10  
FGDs in the working-class locality of Chungi Amer Sidhu in Lahore affirmed this 
widespread expectation from the state. Most respondents believe that the state 
is ultimately responsible for providing electricity at a ‘fair price’ and that a failure 
to do so amounts to a failure in governance. One respondent vocalised her 
expectation by pointing out that ‘if the hakoomat [government] is not ensuring 
that our fans stay on during the summer months, what good is it there for?’ 
 
10  The literature on politics around the electricity sector in Pakistan is extremely sparse. Most written work 
approaches the issue from a technocratic/policy perspective, with diagnosis of long-standing ills and 
suggested recommendations. Apart from Ijlal Naqvi’s excellent work, citizen engagement with the sector 
and how this feeds into politics is sorely lacking. 
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This expectation of access/supply and affordability thus plays an important role 
in how citizens react to perceived disruptions in the contract, or, in other words, 
to the obligation of the state towards them. 
The second aspect is the role of the subsidies and their actual outlay, over and 
above annually budgeted amounts, that attempt to ensure that electricity supply 
is guaranteed. Subsidies are given as the cost of electricity generation exceeds 
the cost at which it is sold to consumers. In other terms, Pakistan’s case reveals 
that taking away TDSs would lead to electricity becoming much more expensive 
for large sections of the consumer base. 
Interviews with politicians and DISCO officials illuminate this dynamic. Several 
categories of urban groups (shopkeepers, small business owners, middle-
income locality residents) are found to be more vocal and better connected to 
decision makers, and thus able to engage in lobbying and protesting for 
continued electricity access, preferably at suppressed rates (Walker et al. 2016). 
Therefore, the government’s failure to continuously provide an escalating TDS to 
IPPs becomes a central reason for generation shortcomings and thus outages, 
which has led to extensive political escalation in electricity related contention. 
As a former Federal Minister for Water and Power put it succinctly:  
No government has ever come in explicitly saying it will give people 
more subsidies. It always comes in saying we will give you 
uninterrupted electricity. But the two are linked because the 
government can’t change the cost of generation, it can only pump in 
more and more money from its own pocket to buy that expensive 
electricity and sell it to consumers for a cheaper price. When the 
money runs out, the electricity runs out and then people come out on 
the streets. 
The twin dynamic of consumer expectations of state obligation towards 
access/supply, and the role of subsidies in ensuring that obligation underlies the 
mechanisms through which subsidies are connected to escalations of energy-
related struggles in Pakistan. 
The literature also proposes that in fragile settings where energy subsidies are 
an important part of the social contract and/or social protection, subsidy regimes 
are likely to come under fiscal pressure, whether from domestic or external 
sources.  
The Pakistan case affirms this tendency in fragile contexts, given the way that 
the electricity crisis starting in 2007 was connected to both exogenous changes 
in the cost of generation (due to the oil price shock) as well as the stagnation of 
economic growth, which drastically reduced the fiscal space available to the 
government to bear the TDS. Over the last three decades, Pakistan’s economic 
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conditions have fluctuated between periodic boom and bust cycles, with periods 
of low/stagnant growth becoming increasingly frequent. Successive governments 
have also struggled to increase exports to pay for energy-related imports, and to 
expand the state revenue base by raising the tax to GDP ratio from a multi-
decade average of 12 per cent (Javed and Nabi 2017).  
These two trends have culminated in spiralling fiscal and current account deficits 
resulting in repeated bailouts by the IMF. In 2019, the country entered its 11th 
IMF programme in 30 years on the back of yet another balance of payments 
crisis. Successive IMF programmes have advocated for a rationalisation of 
electricity-related subsidies (both tariff differential and consumer) to bring down 
fiscal deficits and create alternative mechanisms of social protection in energy 
markets. IMF and other donors continue to argue for improved transmission and 
distribution governance as the primary reform thrust, so that losses can be 
reduced, recovery rates improved, and overall cost of electricity goes down. 
They have also advocated for the privatisation of DISCOs, which continues to be 
opposed by the electricity sector labour unions (Naqvi 2017). 
Empirically, the headline features of Pakistan’s economic fragility – anaemic 
growth and capacity failures to broaden the tax base – produced particularly 
stark consequences in the 2007–15 period, which coincided with the global 
recession and oil price shock. With little fiscal space to begin with, the crises 
severely hampered the state’s ability to undertake further outlays on electricity 
subsidies to ensure supply. The resulting outages also contributed to the pre-
existing fragility in two ways; first by causing a loss of upwards of 4 per cent to 
GDP growth by hampering economic activity, undermining the economy even 
further; and second, by the escalation of public anger that led to widespread 
mobilisation and periodic outbreaks of violence. 
The presence of economic fragility and vulnerability to external shocks provides 
the context in which energy struggles germinate and escalate. A central part of 
the mechanism chain that links these contextual factors with rampant escalation 
of struggles is the way that energy sectors are usually managed in fragile 
contexts. In Pakistan, governance of the electricity sector remains firmly in the 
hands of the federal government bureaucracy, international donors, and a small 
section of top political officials. There is little to no parliamentary or citizen 
oversight of decision-making on key issues, such as the guaranteed returns 
offered to private electricity producers, tariff setting, subsidy outlay, and other 
aspects of sector reform. 
Interviews with elected representatives from government and opposition parties, 
who should theoretically have greater oversight of and input into policy 
processes, confirm the non-participatory and unaccountable nature of decision-
making in the sector. One treasury bench Member of the National Assembly 
(MNA) said that he has to rely on personal goodwill and ‘informal ties’ with 
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DISCO officials in order to get electricity infrastructure (like transformers, wires, 
and poles) upgraded. Another politician, an MPA in a dense urban locality, said 
that on several occasions he has had to pay for basic repairs for a transformer in 
his constituency out of his own pocket, given the cumbersome procedures put in 
place by the electricity sector bureaucracy. 
FGD feedback highlights citizen frustration at the way the sector is managed as 
a whole. Local community elites report the frequently frustrating yet necessary 
nature of cultivated ties with street-level bureaucrats from DISCOs in order to 
resolve issues of access and supply. Many of these relationships involve some 
form of quid pro quo, either in the shape of bribes or favours, and operate as the 
most stable arrangement for citizen grievance redressal. However, when these 
relationships fail to deliver, especially when the sector is under stress and field-
level staff operate with reduced autonomy, communities tend to leverage elected 
representatives to bargain on their behalf. The success of such efforts is by no 
means guaranteed, and interviewees assert that it is contingent on personal 
resources, and the elected representative’s ties to the bureaucracy and his or 
her position of influence within the party, suggesting the insulated nature of the 
power sector. 
The unaccountable nature of the sector was highlighted sharply through the 
findings of a recent report on financial practices within electricity sector 
governance, released in April 2020. Among many aspects, coverage of the 
highly lucrative terms of contracts between IPPs and the government, and the 
failure of regulatory oversight to ensure efficiency, strongly suggest the presence 
of rent-seeking relationships between different national-level business, 
bureaucratic, and political elites linked to the sector (Government of Pakistan 
2020).11  
Media reporting of such revelations tends to reflect underlying sentiments of 
anger and disillusionment among the citizenry. The notion of the electricity sector 
being rife with muk muka (reciprocal corruption) is widespread, and as FGDs 
reveal, citizens perceive themselves to be disempowered as far as most 
decision-making matters within the sector are concerned. 
 
11  A report on suspected contract violations by IPPs which have cost the Pakistani exchequer billions of 
dollars, reveals that IPPs have been generating profits of up to 70 per cent, as against the 15 per cent 
limit set by the NEPRA. Most IPPs had an investment payback period of 2–4 years, profits generated 
were as high as 18.26 times the investment, and dividends 22 times the investment. Under the 1994 
Power Policy, 16 out of 17 IPPs invested a combined capital of PRs 51.8bn and earned profits in excess 
of PRs 415bn. The government’s failure to contain the circular debt has cost the country over PRs 4,082bn 
(approximately US$30bn in 2020) in the past 13 years, with an annual loss of PRs 370bn. 
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4. Energy protests and accountability 
for energy provisioning 
A second set of research propositions addressed the possibility that protests 
about energy enabled citizens to hold governments to account for energy 
provisioning, or indeed other issues. A review of the literature suggests that 
protest episodes that persisted, diffused beyond an urban centre, and gained 
national and international attention had achieved ‘voice’, an important element of 
accountability. This particular proposition was explored through analysis of a 
catalogue of energy protest events. Data collected for the events catalogue 
shows that between 2007 and 2015, Pakistan witnessed 456 contentious 
incidents related to electricity supply, access, and pricing.12 Of these, roughly  
10 per cent (42) could be counted as incidents that formed part of a protest 
episode – a collection of contentious acts that lasted for more than a day and 
took place in several different localities at the same time. Of these, four such 
protest episodes stand out due to their spatial diffusion, scale of escalation, and 
prominent use of violence as a tactic: 
- 31 December 2008 – 3 January 2009 (national) 
- 1–3 October 2011 (Punjab) 
- 19–25 March 2012 (national) 
- 12–19 June 2012 (Punjab) 
Among these four, the October and June protests started from one particular 
locality (Lahore and Kamalia respectively) but quickly spread to a number of big 
and small urban localities.13 Both episodes received considerable attention, 
including in international press outlets. 
Key informant interviews confirm that these protest episodes played a prominent 
part in how the electricity crisis was being understood and was ultimately 
responded to by decision makers in the country. The June 2012 episode, which 
was documented in detail for this case study, stands out in particular during the 
interviews because of the scale of violence and rioting that accompanied the 
 
12  Descriptive statistics from the events catalogue are provided in Annexe 1. 
13  Another reason for the expansive coverage given to the October 2011 and June 2012 protests is due to 
their escalation in the province of Punjab, Pakistan’s wealthiest and politically most salient region. 
Punjab is home to 54 per cent of the country’s population, sends the highest number of legislators to the 
federal parliament, and was perceived to be worse hit than other provinces as far as electricity outages 
were concerned due to its lack of indigenous fuel/energy resources. The provinces of Sindh and Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa both had fewer outages than Punjab, on account of their production of natural gas and 
hydropower resources. FGD responses show that there was also a widely believed story of 
‘victimisation’ on the part of the federal government, which was, until 2013, in control of the largely Sindh 
based PPP, while Punjab was governed by the PMLN. 
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protests which led to the death of ten people. These episodes played an 
important part in elevating the electricity crisis to a position of political primacy for 
both citizens and public authorities. By 2013, survey data shows that citizens 
reported electricity outages as their number one concern, even more so than the 
concurrent wave of Islamist militancy and terrorism that began in 2005.14 
The research also explored whether or not such struggles went from enabling or 
amplifying voice to giving it ‘teeth’ or ‘holding power’ of sufficient magnitude to 
compete for governmental action with more conventionally powerful pressures. 
The framework proposed that the protests needed to demonstrate the capacity 
to incur significant economic or social costs or disruption to major centres, and to 
attract widespread public support or important political champions to qualify as 
having ‘teeth’ as well as ‘voice’. 
The impact of electricity-related contention on public authorities, visible in the 
nature of political discourse during this period and the urgency of the response 
showed after the 2013 General Election, was made possible not just because of 
the number of incidents that had taken place, but also because of their location 
and intensity as well. In this regard, the fact that some of the most violent 
protests (between 2010 and 2013) took place in the wealthiest and politically 
most salient region of North and Central Punjab played an important role in 
shaping political perception and eventually, governmental action. The fact that 
from 2008 to 2013, different political parties governed the federal and Punjab 
governments (with the former being responsible for the management of the 
electricity sector) also added an additional salience to the way the protests were 
perceived.  
Within the cases identified above, the June 2012 protest episode was 
characterised by extensive economic and social disruption in different parts of 
the country. Data collected from newspaper accounts suggest that at least seven 
properties belonging to electricity sector companies (primarily government-run 
DISCOs) were ransacked in different cities. A number of police vehicles were 
torched, especially in the city of Kamalia and Rawalpindi, where the protests 
became the most violent. 
Primary aspects of economic disruption included a three-day blockage of the 
main North-to-South national highway near the district of Toba Tek Singh, 
Punjab, in June, where police and security guard action against rioters led to the 
death of two individuals. Major market associations as well as industrial bodies 
 
14  Between 2005 and 2015, Pakistan experienced significant violence in terms of frequency, scope, and 
magnitude. An examination of the incidence of violence during this period reveals a variety of conflict 
actors, new and old (including armed domestic and transnational non-state groups); varying patterns of 
violence in different regions, both high and low intensity in nature; and an unprecedented number of 
civilian and law-enforcement casualties, estimated to be upwards of 50,000. 
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across the country carried out ‘shutter-down’ strikes, ending all economic activity 
during this time period (Boone 2012).  
An important point to note here is the cross-sectional nature of the ‘protesting 
public’, which greatly enhanced its salience in shaping government action. The 
protests were not just populated by political activists and workers but were 
planned and coordinated by sections of the urban business classes, in particular 
traders, merchants, shopkeepers, and other bazaar-based actors. Data from the 
events catalogue highlights that traders and associated businesses were the 
second most frequent segment involved in electricity related contention.15 Urban 
political economy accounts of contemporary Pakistan, such as those by Akhtar 
(2018) and Javed (2017), identify traders and associated businesses as a 
politically salient demographic, given their role in financing political activity at the 
constituency level and their status as local community leaders. Furthermore, 
opposition parties were quick to capitalise on public anger as it gave them a 
chance to demonstrate their representative credentials with key urban 
demographics. 
Analysis of existing work on contentious politics around energy suggests that 
governments would be likely to combine temporary concessions with active 
repression of energy protests, and efforts to prevent or pre-empt such protests to 
facilitate future rounds of subsidy reforms. 
However, research on similar dynamics in Pakistan between 2007 and 2015 
reveals that the reaction of public authorities to electricity protests was 
infrequently repressive. Using the events catalogue, out of the 242 incidents of 
contention where definitive public authority response was recorded, only 8 per 
cent saw police using force to disperse protestors.16 These incidents were the 
most violent electricity riots (such as those in October 2011 and June 2012), 
where government infrastructure and private property of politicians associated 
with the ruling party was directly damaged.17 On the other hand, the most 
common outcome (~42 per cent) was protracted negotiations between protestors 
and local DISCO officials, mediated by the police and district administration, to 
limit unscheduled outages. These were also most likely to be the cases where 
outage problems were restricted and thus protests had not spread to other 
localities. 
An important reason for the generally low levels of police action is the political 
dynamic that governed different tiers of decision-making between 2008 and 2013. 
 
15  Occupational details of protestors, where available, are given in the Annexe. 
16  An even smaller number of incidents (n=3) involved paramilitary authorities, such as the Punjab 
Rangers, being called in to quell the protests. 
17  The June 2012 riots originated from a protest against outages directed against a Federal Government 
Minister, Riaz Fatyana, in his hometown of Kamalia. Fatyana accused the police of inaction during the 
initial protest, compelling his personal guards to open fire in order to control the situation; this in turn set 
off an escalatory spiral that culminated in extensive rioting. 
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The PPP-controlled federal government from 2008 to 2013 frequently accused 
the PMLN-led Punjab government of not clamping down on protests as law and 
order was a provincial subject, and it allowed the PMLN to stoke sentiment 
against the federal government for political gain. Interviews with PMLN 
representatives and members of the local district administration in the cities of 
Lahore and Kamalia/Toba Tek Singh hinted that urgency for police action only 
kicked in once damage to private property became a real possibility, while road 
blockages were tacitly permitted to allow protestors to ‘vent’. 
In one interview, an important member of the municipal administration (an 
Assistant Commissioner) in the city of Bahawalpur, who was posted there during 
2012, mentioned that police themselves were reluctant to take action against 
protestors due to shared circumstances. As the electricity crisis impacted every 
citizen, working and middle-class policemen would often face the same 
shortages in their workplaces and residences, and thus empathised with citizen 
anger. In order to curtail damage, the local administration would often use 
informal ties between businessmen and political leaders as leverage in the 
community to request protestors to dissipate. Formal action was normally used in 
the last resort, and only after explicit political approval had been granted by the 
provincial government. 
Beyond calling for police action, the federal government’s immediate response to 
escalating protests during the 2008–13 phase was to make temporary measures 
to restore electricity supply. This involved period release of non-budgeted 
amounts of subsidies in order to pay for natural gas and oil that could enable 
electricity generation to take place. In October 2011, for example, after protests 
entered into their third day and with outages approaching 12 hours per day in 
urban centres, the government mandated the emergency release of US$120m 
for the purchase and supply of refined furnace oil to two major IPPs. 
Another response seen during this time period was to provide temporary relief 
from outages in areas witnessing electricity-related protests by diverting from 
other zones within the grid. The data required to establish this strategy 
systematically is hard to come by; however, interviews with DISCO officials who 
served in sub-divisional jurisdictions where protests were prominent mentioned 
that they would receive calls from higher officials to revise outage schedules 
based on law-and-order concerns.18  
A further proposition regarding accountability following energy protests is that 
policy reform proposals would be likely to include significant efforts for inclusive 
 
18  It is not easy to establish just how frequent such decisions were made and more information is needed 
through interviews and transmission dispatch data. Scheduled outages of 4–6 hours per day were 
already built into the system and communicated to consumers on a regular basis. Most of the public 
anger would be about unscheduled outages, especially those that exceeded 8–10 hours. Diversions of 
electricity from one neighbourhood to another can only take place at the sub-divisional level. 
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and participatory policy spaces, consultation with affected groups, attention to 
the impacts of subsidy reforms on poverty and inequality, etc., and policies for 
addressing those adverse effects. 
Pakistan’s experience with electricity sector reform from 2013 onwards highlights 
the entrenched persistence of insular and highly centralised governance 
practices in key areas of governmental decision-making. However, the response 
to escalating struggles over electricity access did not transform the institutional 
architecture of policy formulation and implementation in any meaningful way. 
The 2013 General Election was contested as a referendum on the electricity 
crisis. Its results showed voters penalising the previous incumbent, the PPP, for 
its management of the crisis, especially in the worst-impacted part of the country, 
Punjab. Its successor, the PMLN, had campaigned on a platform slogan of 
Roshan Pakistan (Bright Pakistan), a nod to its intent to end prolonged outages 
and kickstart the economy. The messaging clearly resonated with the public, as 
it swept two-thirds of the seats available in the province of Punjab, and ended 
with a clear majority in the federal legislature. 
The reform strategy adopted, however, was highly centralised and technocratic 
in nature. The then prime minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, put together a small team 
of handpicked bureaucrats, political confidantes, policy advisors, and sanctioned 
the hiring of an international management consulting firm, to prepare a roadmap 
to end outages.19 External support was drawn in from the World Bank as well as 
the Chinese government which fronted approximately US$33bn in concessional 
loans under CPEC to improve generation and transmission capacity. 
Interviews with elected representatives from the PMLN highlight that the 
government was mindful of public sentiment on the electricity crisis and 
understood that its electoral future rested on a quick redressal of the problem. 
However, the highly centralised ethos of the party and its preferred strategy of 
governing through bureaucrats and technocratic appointees dictated the 
modalities of its reform agenda. Parliamentary oversight, for example, which 
might have institutionalised some form of participation and inclusion of citizen 
voice was ignored throughout this time period. 
This became particularly apparent as the government entered into a number of 
agreements with the Chinese on enhancing generation capacity. As with 
previous rounds of foreign and local private investment in the generation sector, 
this time, too, the terms offered to Chinese contractors and investors between 
2013 and 2018 were neither publicly debated nor submitted to parliamentary 
scrutiny. Resultantly, by 2020, the next government’s investigation into the fiscal 
failings of the electricity sector revealed that the new generation capacity 
 
19  Information on who was leading the electricity reform process was never made explicitly public by the 
government; this information was gathered through key informant interviews. 
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inducted within this decade had helped change the fuel mix and reduced 
dependency on imported oil, but had not reduced the overall fiscal burden of 
generation (through fixed purchase tariffs and capacity payments) by much 
(Government of Pakistan 2020).20 This view is echoed by the power sector 
regulator NEPRA in its State of Industry Report 2020, which once again raised 
the issue of validity of power purchase agreements executed by the federal 
government with private producers, as well as ‘excess’ payments made to them 
and the accumulation of massive circular debt due to the costly nature of 
generation (NEPRA 2020). 
Finally, the continued insularity of the reform process is also demonstrated by 
the fact that while the PMLN government was successful in ensuring adequate 
electricity supply – partly because of reduced generation costs due to a fortunate 
decline in oil prices from 2014 onwards and partly because of the influx of new 
generation capacity that changed the fuel mix – it did not pay adequate attention 
to the complementary issue of electricity affordability, which afflicts the poorest 
consumers. Successive increases in consumer electricity tariffs to bring them 
closer to the cost of generation (as recommended by the previous two IMF 
programmes), and a failure to meaningfully improve DISCO governance that 
would reduce distribution losses/thefts/non-payments and decrease pressures 
on the determined tariff, showcase that even after the crisis public authorities do 
not prioritise affordability and financial viability of the sector as an important pillar 
of the reform process.21  
 
 
20  The inquiry report revealed that in March 2015, the Huaneng Shandong Ruyi (Pak) Energy Ltd (HSR) 
for 2x660 MW coal-based thermal plants submitted a cost assumption of US$145.59m against Interest 
During Construction (IDC). After the ‘commercial operation date’, HSR submitted revised tariff rates of 
IDC in January 2019 amounting to US$197.33m. HSR had claimed IDC based on mark-up or long-term 
London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) plus 4.5 per cent during the entire construction period, whereas 
the financial statements of the company revealed that it did not borrow any funds in the first year of 
construction and obtained short-term loans at subsequently lower interest rates during the second year 
of construction. 
21  The determined tariff remains high because it includes allowances for theft and non-payments as well as 
technical losses due to the transmission infrastructure. Improvements on these fronts would reduce the 
cost of electricity as it would reduce the gap between the determined tariff and the notified tariff at a 
lower overall level, and reduce the fiscal outlay the government has to make to ensure adequate supply. 
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5. Energy struggles as a source of 
citizen empowerment 
Among the propositions reviewed for this research was the suggestion that 
popular struggles around energy built on previous episodes of mobilisation 
around common concerns, and the presence of organisational leadership from 
groups with a history of such struggles. Pakistan’s experience with contention 
around electricity confirms the proposition related to the demographic and 
sociological features of protestors. In the two field-sites chosen for in-depth 
investigation into electricity protests, Kamalia and Chungi Amer Sidhu (Lahore), 
research made it apparent that mobilisation was made possible by the pre-
existing presence of organisational infrastructure.  
In the case of the working-class neighbourhood of Chungi Amer Sidhu, Lahore, 
the main organisational vehicle was a community-based organisation (CBO) 
called the Progressive Youth Front (PYF), formed by activists previously 
associated with labour unions in the nearby industrial cluster of Kot Lakhpat. The 
main organisers had also been affiliated with a local left wing political party and 
drew on their experience to set up a neighbourhood-based organisation. The 
activists also had political ambitions to compete in local government elections 
and saw the formation of a local CBO that dealt with service delivery complaints 
of residents as a way of cultivating a support base. Other members of the 
protesting public in this area included former women councillors who had served 
as local government representatives and had ties to politicians from both the PTI 
and the PMLN. Collectively, these organisers were supported by local 
shopkeepers and businesses who saw their ability to mobilise young people from 
the area as a useful way to place pressure on public authorities.  
In the same vein, incidents of protests in the town of Kamalia, including the 
large-scale riot in June 2012, would not have attained the same scale and 
prominence without the considerable involvement of the market traders’ 
association (Anjuman-e-Tajran Kamalia). As previously mentioned, traders 
constitute important public and political actors due to their financial, spatial, and 
status-based role in society. Their linkages with political parties, and in particular, 
the PMLN in Punjab, were instrumental in bringing large numbers of people on to 
the streets to protest against outages. This dynamic is important to mention in 
Pakistan’s case – in the instances that we were able to track in detail, protests 
were organised and initiated by ostensibly non-partisan community-based actors 
(local businessmen, neighbourhood elites), however opposition political party 
activists and leaders would often become prominent participants as they 
progressed. It is thus reasonable to suggest that for these large-scale episodes 
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of contention in Pakistan, the presence and working of political party leaders and 
activists was central to their escalation. 
The research also proposed that popular mobilisation around energy was likely 
to feature mainly young urban men, and that such protests could as a result be 
inattentive to the needs of other social groups – women and children, rural 
people, the poorest – or for differing types of energy. 
The findings from Pakistan significantly validates this proposition in multiple 
ways. For starters, cultural and socioeconomic constraints ensured that protest 
organisers were on many occasions better-off urban men, with protest 
participants often being working-class or lower middle class in nature. The 
protests against outages in Kamalia, for example, revealed that trader 
association representatives called for the protest, held the ‘shutter-down’ strike, 
and then ordered their shop employees (sales staff, loaders, and helpers) to 
block the main highway. The original group of protestors was then supplemented 
by local constituents of the opposition party politician who subsequently joined 
the protest. 
In the case of Chungi, Lahore, numerous service delivery complaints – related to 
water shortages, electricity bill distortions and outages, and natural gas 
disruptions – actually originated from women residents of the neighbourhood, 
who had to deal with these more prominently due to the nature of domestic work. 
This finding is also echoed by other work on electricity in Pakistan which finds 
that women are the main electricity consumers at the household level, and 
therefore more directly affected by supply disruptions (Walker et al. 2016).  
The question of what issues are taken up more prominently is one in which we 
see extensive variation due to gender and class dynamics. According to 
interviews with businessmen, government officials, and political representatives, 
one reason why public authorities prioritised generation enhancement and 
supply consistency is because outages impacted lives and livelihoods across 
different social classes. While home-based solutions to guard against outages 
(like fuel-run generators and uninterrupted power supplies) were widely adopted 
between 2007 and 2015, they remained costly and did not offer adequate 
substitutes, especially for commercial and industrial purposes. Hence the 
pressure imposed by elite, middle-class, and working-class actors on public 
authorities, both in the shape of public mobilisation, as well as extensive 
backdoor lobbying, was felt very strongly and accordingly dictated response. 
On the other hand, the issue of affordability of electricity is one that politically 
impacts disempowered socioeconomic groups (fringe urban communities, rural 
consumers) more so than others. Even within these groups, there is a gendered 
dynamic on affordability given the way household labour is divided. Community 
interviews carried out with women respondents in Chungi showed that 
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affordability issues remain a pressing concern, given household budget trade-
offs. Frequent overbilling, for example, is a persistent complaint, but one that 
most respondents have to live with in order to avoid disconnections or further 
surcharges. 
Walker et al.’s (2016) analysis of household coping strategies to energy pricing 
echoes these findings. Both low-income and lower-middle-income households 
reported reducing spending on food to pay electricity bills. Katchi abadi (informal 
settlement) residents, Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) beneficiaries 
and low-income households mentioned reducing the number of meals consumed 
and cutting out meat and other proteins. Lower-middle-income households, on 
the other hand, reported switching to lower-quality foods. Low-income 
households also reported cutting spending on childcare and education (e.g. 
sending children to public schools, and economising on school uniforms and 
equipment). Some respondents also reported reducing health expenses by 
avoiding doctor visits and using self-treatment. 
In the same vein, in FGDs carried out in Chungi several respondents said that 
they had stopped purchasing meat because of both affordability concerns and 
because storing it in a refrigerator or a freezer meant incurring electricity costs. 
These class and gender dynamics point to areas of concern around energy that 
do not impact public discourse and political events in the same manner that 
supply disruptions and outages have historically done in the preceding two 
decades. More data and research are required to better understand what coping 
strategies are utilised on issues of affordability and how they relate to citizen 
relations with public authorities. 
We also explored the proposition that the experience of participating in or 
witnessing protests could create a sense of the potency of collective action. 
Interviews with protest participants in Kamalia and Chungi and with decision-
makers at the field level and the policy level point to mixed legacies of protest 
from an empowerment perspective. Protest organisers in Chungi were optimistic 
about the role that protests play; according to them, the fact that outages had 
reduced was directly the result of people coming out on the streets and holding 
public authorities to account. This view was also echoed by members of the 
Kamalia Traders’ Association, who said that the ex-prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, 
paid attention to the demands of the public when he stepped into office in 2013, 
unlike Zardari (leader of the PPP), who ignored them. 
At the same time, other protest participants were less enthused by the long-term 
impact of protests. They were reluctant to draw a direct connection between their 
presence on the streets and the eventual decisions taken by the government to 
improve generation capacity. Part of this is likely down to the insular nature of 
decision-making and the lack of institutionalised contact between voters, 
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politicians, and those governing the energy sector in the country. Several 
respondents in Chungi also complained that even if the supply of electricity has 
gone up, their concerns about costs have never been paid attention to, and that 
local DISCO officials are quite rude and rarely attentive to their complaints about 
overbilling. 
On the other hand, DISCO officials spoken to during the course of this research 
appeared very wary of prolonged supply outages given what they witnessed 
between 2007 and 2015. One DISCO official said that the threat to their lives 
posed by ‘mobs’ was extremely acute at that time and continues to condition the 
way they deal with outages and public anger. Another official said that DISCOs 
cannot afford prolonged outages because people are now aware that violent 
protests often work. 
Politicians and other senior decision makers echo this in so far that they assert 
the political non-negotiability of electricity supply since the crisis. Given the 
important role played by electricity in shaping political outcomes in 2013, 
representatives from all mainstream parties, and particularly the two based in the 
largest province of Punjab – PTI and PMLN – acknowledge that an outage crisis, 
for whatever reason, can prove to be a political death knell. In one interview, a 
senior leader from the ex-ruling party involved with the electricity sector reform 
process stated that:  
MNAs would visit Islamabad (the capital) and tell us they were afraid 
to go into their constituencies because of anger. Mian Mannan (MNA 
from Faisalabad) said he had a PhD in swear words and even he 
hadn’t heard some of the abuse words he received during his visit to 
Sootar Mandi (yarn market in Faisalabad). This is the party’s core 
support base and it had to respond to it someway. 
Overall, the findings for this proposition echo the ones stated earlier, that while 
electricity supply has become an important political artefact given its cross-
sectional importance, affordability and associated service-delivery aspects are 
neither prioritised nor addressed in any meaningful way. 
We explored the possibility that popular protest would dissipate when facing 
uninhibited state repression. We also sought evidence of empowerment that 
would include sustained campaigns or organisations pursuing the claims of the 
protests, or that protest groups or representative actors had played a substantive 
part in participatory and consultative processes over fuel price and social 
protection policies, including in setting the terms of such ‘invited spaces’. 
Closely related to the findings of the preceding proposition, and as expounded in 
the preceding section, is the fact that the architecture of energy governance in 
the country did not see any substantive change during and after the supply crisis. 
Decision-making continues to be done outside of representative oversight and in 
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the absence of any inclusive channels. The legacy of contention has, so far, 
been absorbed into broader service delivery politics of mainstream parties 
through a centrality attached to ensuring supply but has not led to the formation 
of any civil society organisations that can articulate citizen voice on the issue. 
However, the protest dissipation from 2015 onwards cannot be said to be a 
result of repression. It is more closely associated with the fact that the demand of 
those most influential within the protests has been met on an urgent basis by the 
state itself. The remaining concerns around affordability, for example, remain tied 
to populations under-represented in the political mainstream, and do not feature 
in the existing rent-driven incentive structure of elite actors. Similarly, the lack of 
emergence of any viable organisational form is closely tied to the underlying 
legacy of weak civil society activity in the country; much of what does exist is 
closely tied to the interests and agendas of international donor agencies. While 
more work is needed to establish this claim, it can be cautiously suggested that 
this gap is due to energy-related citizen empowerment not being central to the 
donor agenda in the country. 
We further expected that state efforts to restrict civic and political space to 
prevent protests would disempower protestors committed to peaceful and legal 
means of contention, and that protests after a clampdown would be violent and 
deadly. 
While the evidence presented here makes it clear that long-term empowerment 
on energy-related issues was not an outcome of contention in the country, it is 
also worth adding that the state did not specifically reduce the space for service 
delivery related protests, even while the crisis was ongoing. As already 
mentioned, violent police action was only witnessed in a small minority of cases, 
with protracted negotiations and political leverage often being deployed by 
municipal administrators to defuse protests. 
Part of this can be traced back to the factors outlined earlier – the socioeconomic 
and political profile of those organising the contention, the contingent tensions 
between federal and provincial governments which reduced police deployment, 
and the shared sympathies between local administrations and protestors given 
the universal nature of the outage crisis. Therefore, we do not expect to see an 
escalation in violence based on a dynamic of restriction of civic and political 
space. 
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6. Transnational actors and the 
contentious political economy of 
energy  
The last aspect of this research explored whether and how countries with 
ongoing IMF austerity reforms were under pressure to cut downstream 
consumer fuel subsidies, and so were at greater risk of fuel price protests.  
Since the global economic downturn of 2007, Pakistan has entered three 
separate IMF programmes (2008, 2013, 2019) on the back of ballooning fiscal 
deficits and balance of payment crises, making it a good case to evaluate the link 
between structural adjustment programmes and energy-related contention. 
While subsidy removal (or rationalisation) was a key pillar of each programme, it 
was particularly prominent in 2008, which coincided with the uptick in electricity 
related contention (IMF 2007, 2009). However, the mechanism through which 
removal and protest are related is not as straightforward. 
Subsidy removal in Pakistan’s case was largely related to the TDS offered by the 
government to bridge the cost of generation and the cost faced by the end-
consumer. The solution proposed repeatedly by the IMF, as well as the ADB and 
the World Bank, was regular increments in tariff to ‘full-cost’ recovery, to 
incorporate the overall increase in cost of generation posed by rising oil prices, 
and thus for the gradual removal of the TDS. Successive governments have 
been reluctant to comply with this fully, given the inflationary and politically 
sensitive impact of increases in the electricity tariff, which rendered the TDS 
necessary.  
However, IMF programme fiscal deficit conditionalities also meant that 
governments were restricted in terms of the amount of resources they could 
spend on TDS to ensure sufficient generation was being carried out. In the 
absence of large fiscal outlays to cover the cost of fuel and generation, private 
sector electricity suppliers would stop producing, thus leading to outages (IMF 
2013). 
Overall, then, the IMF’s advice for subsidy removal and tariff adjustment was 
indirectly linked to the outage crisis (and its ensuing protests) because it placed 
restrictions on the amount of money the government could spend to keep 
generation online, while keeping tariffs low. In both the 2008 and the 2013 
programmes, upward adjustment of the electricity tariff to bring it closer to the 
cost of generation was a key conditionality, and one that governments, due to 
their obvious political implications, complied with only partially. It bears reiterating 
that equity analysis of the TDS with low consumer end tariffs, shows the biggest 
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advantage of the subsidies being accrued to the richest category of consumers. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that after a major upward tariff adjustment 
undertaken by the government (on the IMF’s insistence) the share of electricity 
subsidies for the richest 20 per cent of the population declined from nearly 40 per 
cent in March 2008 to 29 per cent in March 2011 (Trimble, Yoshida and Saqib 
2011). 
While it would be incorrect to suggest that IMF restrictions on government 
spending were completely responsible for generation reduction, given that the 
inability to spend more to curtail outages was also shaped by poor recoveries by 
some of the DISCOs,22 a stagnant economy, limited revenues, and exorbitant 
fuel prices, the IMF’s conditionalities did play an important role in shaping the 
context that led to a period of significant electricity-related contention. However, it 
is worth mentioning that the uptake of IMF programmes is related to imprudent 
macroeconomic management, such as excessive fiscal deficits, some of which 
go to provide subsidies for expensively generated electricity. 
The Pakistan case also lends itself to an evaluation of the extent to which 
international aid donors were sensitive to the political repercussions of popular 
protests around energy as were national elites, and alert to the political economy 
of fuel subsidy reforms. 
IMF documents from 2007 onwards showcase a firm stance on the removal of 
‘distortionary subsidies’ and an increase in electricity tariffs to improve 
macroeconomic stability (IMF 2009, 2013, 2017). Simultaneously, though, 
governments during this period were urged to spend more on direct social 
protection (such as BISP, the country’s largest unconditional cash transfer 
programme) to ease the burden of higher tariffs and reduced subsidies (Bacon 
2019). 
The 2008–13 period, in particular, was one in which political repercussions 
weighed heavily on the federal government’s decision-making, especially around 
tariff increases. As mentioned earlier, this was a time marked by slow economic 
growth and in which the ruling party, the PPP, had to rely on a range of coalition 
partners to secure a majority in parliament. The political space available to take 
unpopular inflationary decisions was extremely small, which meant that tariff 
increments were either delayed, or of a magnitude smaller than required to 
maintain the financial viability of the electricity supply chain. 
As earlier work by Trimble et al. (2011) details, the government’s notified tariff 
remained consistently below the cost-recovery tariff determined by the regulator, 
 
22  The efficiency of DISCOs in collecting dues varies considerably. In 2018, the best had a domestic 
consumer recovery rate of 99 per cent, while the worst performing one had a recovery rate of 36 per 
cent. However, the tariff notified by the government is uniform for all of them (with variation in terms of 
consumer category, time of consumption, and level of total consumption), which essentially means that 
the high-performing DISCOs subsidise the poor-performing ones. 
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NEPRA, during this time period. The increments that did take place were largely 
due to the conditionalities imposed by the stabilisation agreement with the IMF, 
as well as the technical assistance conditions attached to large-scale borrowing 
from the World Bank. 
During interviews, officials from donor agencies tended to downplay their 
influence and role in the electricity sector. One senior representative of the World 
Bank, who had been involved in the reform process of 1994, pointed out that a 
way of assessing donor influence is to look at how many of the decisions have 
actually been implemented. Similarly, an IMF staff member based in Pakistan 
said that until 2013, reluctance to revise tariffs and make regular fuel price 
adjustments to meet the cost of generation, as advised by them, is indication of 
the political considerations from entrenched segments that public authorities 
remain mindful of, and shows the lack of influence donors actually have.23  
While tensions between transnational actors and public authorities are prevalent 
in a range of country contexts, the role of the former in shaping the overall 
electricity sector in Pakistan cannot be understated. The primary reform process 
that led to privatisation of generation and a reduced role of the state on one end 
of the supply chain was conceived and led by the World Bank (Aziz and Ahmed 
2015).24 Since the start of Pakistan’s private electricity market in the late 1990s, 
the International Finance Corporation has made direct investments of over 
US$850m in 19 projects (Zhang 2018). 
The framing of what ails the electricity sector and what needs to be done to 
resolve it is also devised by transnational actors, as part of larger efforts to 
induce macroeconomic reforms. Across interviews with senior electricity sector 
officials and donors, privatisation of DISCOs and the creation of a competitive 
market in distribution were uniformly cited as the long-term solution. Similarly, the 
need to switch public conceptions of electricity away from being viewed as a right 
to a commodity – a long-standing transnational actor framing – was also echoed 
by respondents currently part of the federal government’s taskforce on energy 
sector reform. 
The relative homogeneity in the way the sector is understood and how 
responses are shaped can be traced back to the way that its governing 
architecture is set up. As mentioned in the earlier sections, the electricity sector 
 
23  The indication here, and one that is borne out of the subsidy analysis, is that rather than social welfare 
considerations, it is the benefit accrued to richer consumers that governments are interested in 
protecting. 
24  Interestingly, the commercial terms that offered cost-plus basis and a guaranteed return on equity to 
private investors in generation were conceived, in part, by the World Bank. These contracts entailed that 
fuel costs and variable operating and maintenance costs automatically pass through to determined 
generation tariffs, and plants receive a fixed capacity payment under long-term ‘take or pay’ contracts. It 
is now widely acknowledged that these terms were over-generous and have contributed to the financial 
ill-health of the entire sector. In interviews, World Bank staff maintain that these terms were necessary to 
mobilise investment in what is a particularly low-investment country context. 
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is highly centralised with the federal government bureaucracy controlling almost 
all aspects of purchase, transmission and distribution. Political oversight is 
limited to the prime minister’s office and the ministers for Finance and Energy (or 
Water and Power as the case was earlier), with preferential access given to 
powerful domestic business conglomerates (and increasingly Chinese 
companies) involved in electricity generation.  
Given the country’s bureaucratic structures and history of authoritarian rule, 
Parliament continues to have a negligible role in energy policy formulation, while 
civil society organisations working in this space are either absent or too weak to 
influence political discourse; at the same time, fiscal constraints and structural 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities that lead to periodic crises enhance the role 
played by lenders and donors in the country’s political economy. It is within this 
environment that transnational actors and technocrats retain a privileged and 
considerably insular place in framing the debate around energy in Pakistan, one 
that has not changed much even after a prolonged period of crisis between 2007 
and 2015. 
We also proposed that external investment in energy infrastructure was likely to 
be highly contentious, particularly if human rights and due process were not 
observed in the planning process. Governments pushing through infrastructure 
and other economic development policies are likely to restrict space for civil 
society actors and the media to research or report on issues of energy 
investment and big projects. 
China’s increasing footprint on Pakistan’s energy sector from 2013 onwards 
provides considerable evidence for this proposition. To date, 12 electricity 
generation projects, sponsored by Chinese loans and built/operated by Chinese 
companies, have either entered the construction phase or have begun their 
commercial operations. The total installed capacity of these projects is 7,240MW 
with an investment of about US$12.4bn. A further US$18bn is expected to be 
invested in an additional 12 projects up to 2025 (Andersen and Yang 2018).  
As has previously been the case with private investments in generation, the 
terms offered to Chinese companies were not subject to substantial political 
oversight or deliberation. The government’s own investigation into the financial 
health of the electricity sector revealed that in the case of two large coal power 
projects, Chinese investors asked for an unconditional acceptance of an up-front 
tariff, which was accepted by the regulator, NEPRA. 
Similarly, land for the construction of one of the two coal-powered projects was 
purchased on behalf of the investor by the government through exercising the 
power of eminent domain in the agricultural district of Sahiwal.25 Concerns raised 
 
25  In one account, a villager alleged that the government had threatened him with anti-terrorism charges if 
he refused to sell the land. 
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by environmental and food security activists were repeatedly ignored, as the 
government cited national security and developmental ambitions as overriding 
factors. Overall, public authorities have repeatedly cited national security and 
geo-strategic factors as justifications for the lack of transparency and heightened 
centralised control around Chinese investment in the country (Boni and Adeney 
2020). 
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7. Conclusions: Did energy struggles 
empower people to hold their 
rulers to account in Pakistan? 
What does Pakistan’s experience with electricity related protests reveal? How 
did the 456 contentious incidents between 2007 and 2015 impact state–society 
relations, issues of empowerment and accountability, and more specifically, the 
nature of energy-related service provision? 
7.1 Fragility and contention in Pakistan 
Looking back at the key propositions developed for this research, a number of 
features from Pakistan’s case provide both validation as well as nuance to the 
relationship between energy provision and contention in a context marked by 
fragility. Fragile countries are marked by low levels of trust and de-institutionalised 
relations between states and citizens, high degrees of economic instability, and 
various forms and axes of violent conflict. Pakistan’s case demonstrates all three 
features to varying degrees. 
More specifically, the electricity crisis was borne out of endemic macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities that made the country especially susceptible to shocks, such as 
the rapid increase in global oil prices from 2007 onwards. This coupled with fiscal 
constraints imposed by anaemic growth and a small revenue base for the state 
meant that there was little room to withstand and ease the consequences of an 
exogenous event of this nature. 
Compounding this issue is the absence of institutionalised participatory channels 
for resolving complex policy and service-delivery questions, especially in an 
environment of adverse exogenous shocks. This fact – a trait in many countries 
with authoritarian legacies – is particularly relevant for Pakistan’s energy sector, 
which remains managed by a narrow political and bureaucratic elite, driven by 
rent-seeking considerations. The lack of oversight, and the absence of functional 
accountability channels through representative forums such as parliamentary 
committees or consumer-centred citizen groups further prevent any meaningful 
reform on key issues of affordability and sustainability from taking place. 
7.2 The contingent possibility of accountability 
after contention 
The pervasive incidence of electricity-related contention in Pakistan between 
2007 and 2015 offers key insights into what contextual and contingent factors 
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make public authorities take action, especially in countries where programmatic 
and institutionalised pathways for accountability remain absent. 
Principally, the case reveals that the role of geography, electoral incentives, 
protest participants, and timing of protests were extremely important in shaping 
how authorities eventually responded to the crisis in the electricity sector. In 
particular, the urgency of the response shown after the 2013 General Election, 
was made possible by the fact that some of the most violent protests (between 
2010 and 2013) took place in the wealthiest and politically most salient region of 
North and Central Punjab. 
This was further compounded by fact that from 2008 to 2013, different political 
parties governed the federal and Punjab governments (the PPP as federal 
government being responsible for the management of the electricity sector, and 
the PMLN as Punjab government being responsible for maintaining law and 
order) adding salience to the way the protests were perceived. PMLN leaders 
rode on an upswell in public anger by participating in local community-based 
protests, giving the resources needed to snowball small events into bigger 
episodes of contention. The local law and order apparatus, under control of the 
party, was asked to refrain from violent crackdowns on protestors, unless 
significant damage to public property was incurred. These factors allowed 
protests to achieve both ‘voice’ and ‘teeth’, shaping political discourse in a way 
that the incumbent federal tier ruling party, the PPP, was cast as principally 
responsible for the electricity shortages, and the 2013 General Election were 
considered as a single-issue referendum to establish the importance of resolving 
the crisis. This electoral pressure is what shaped the PMLN’s eventual actions in 
office once it succeeded at the polls. 
Another key aspect that enabled some form of action relates to the identity of the 
protestors and the groups most active in vocalising their discontentment. The 
protests were not just populated by political activists or workers but were planned 
and coordinated by sections of the urban business classes, in particular traders, 
merchants, shopkeepers, and other bazaar-based actors. Data from the events 
catalogue highlights that traders and associated businesses were the second 
most frequent segment involved in electricity related contention. Extant literature 
has already identified traders and associated businesses as a politically salient 
demographic, given their role in financing political activity at the constituency 
level and their status as local community leaders. Thus, parties in opposition 
during the 2008–13 period, such as the PMLN were quick to capitalise on public 
anger as it gave them a chance to demonstrate their representative credentials 
with key urban demographics. 
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7.3 The (im)possibility of empowerment 
While public authorities responded to the electricity shortage crisis by prioritising 
generation enhancement and ensuring consistent supply, its approach as a 
whole continued to echo older patterns of narrow, and exclusionary elite-led 
management of complex policy issues. The architecture of energy governance in 
the country did not see any substantive change during and after the supply crisis. 
Decision-making continues to be done outside of representative oversight and in 
the absence of any inclusive channels, while rent-seeking considerations remain 
prevalent in how major financial decisions are undertaken. The legacy of the 
period of contention between 2007 and 2015 was absorbed into broader ‘service 
delivery politics’ of mainstream parties with increased centrality accorded to the 
question of electricity supply, But it did not impact the way the sector was 
governed or managed as a whole in a way that could empower citizens and 
address key concerns around affordability and sustainability. Technocratic 
advice around marketisation and privatisation, dispensed by donors and local 
policy experts, drives the policy conversation, while structures of rent extraction, 
selective concessions, and political expediency dictate sector governance.  
Part of this is down to the institutional legacy of elite-capture of policymaking and 
the political process as a whole. Pakistan’s political parties remain beholden to 
elite interests and remain poorly institutionalised actors with little organisational 
links to marginalised groups in society. The absence of electoral channels of 
accountability with these marginalised groups, in contrast to responsive links with 
business elites and other upper-income segments, mean that there is little 
pressure ‘from below’ to change the way that policymaking and governance is 
carried out. Thus, the headline legacy of electricity-related contention is public 
authorities responding to immediate demands made by politically salient and 
powerful sections of the population, while ignoring the long-standing concerns of 
the poor and the marginalised. 
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Figure A2 Occupational profile of protestors 
Source: Authors’ own 
 
Figure A3 Frequency of violence in protests 
Source: Authors’ own 
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